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Abstract
People reason about real-estate prices both in terms of general rules and in terms of analogies
to similar cases. We propose to examine empirically which mode of reasoning ﬁts the data better.
To this end, we develop the statistical techniques required for the estimation of the case-based
model. It is hypothesized that case-based reasoning will have relatively more explanatory power
in databases of rental apartments, whereas rule-based reasoning will have a relative advantage in
sales data. We motivate this hypothesis on theoretical grounds, and ﬁnd empirical support for it
by comparing the two statistical models (rule-based and case-based) on two databases (rentals and
sales).
∗We wish to thank Don Brown for the conversations that greatly inﬂuenced this work. We thank
the Student Association of Tel-Aviv University and Professor Juval Portugali for the data. This
work was supported by grants from the Sapir Center at Tel-Aviv University as well as ISF grants
no. 975/03 and 355/06.1 Introduction
1.1 The problem
Mary wishes to sell her apartment in the city. How should she determine her
asking price? She would probably base her decision on the data available to
her regarding apartment prices as a function of the apartment￿ s characteris-
tics, such as location, area, view, and so forth. Mary might wish to assess the
value of her apartment based on more sophisticated theories. For instance,
she might start with the price she paid for her apartment and add an an-
nual appreciation that seems reasonable to her. Or she might try to predict
market trends and ￿gure out how much the apartment should be worth. But
such theories should also be consistent with the data regarding the sales of
other apartments. Indeed, considering price as a function of characteristics
directly might be viewed as a reduced form model that Mary can use as a
proxy for more involved theories.
How would Mary go about assessing the value of her apartment given a
database of the prices of other apartments? Casual observation suggests that
two modes of reasoning are very common in generating such assessments. The
￿rst relies on general rules, such as, ￿In this area, the price per squared meter
is $3,000￿ . The second is case-based, as in the argument, ￿The apartment
next door, practically identical to mine, was just sold for $300,000￿ . Indeed,
in the US the standard assessment procedure involves two assessments, one
that is rule-based and another that is case-based.
It seems safe to assume that, for the most part, both types of reasoning
are present when a person attempts to assess the market price of a real-
estate asset. The question we wish to address is whether one can make
any qualitative predictions regarding the relative importance of rule-based
versus case-based reasoning. In particular, what economic considerations
might a⁄ect the type of reasoning that agents tend to engage in?1
1The precise distinction between rule-based and case-based reasoning is an interesting
1
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Are modes of reasoning that agents use for determining apartment prices
relevant to economics? Modes of reasoning seem to belong to disciplines
such as psychology or marketing. Economics, by contrast, concerns itself with
actual behavior. Moreover, housing decisions are typically weighty enough to
warrant serious consideration by the agents involved. Hence, one might argue
that agents would think about such problems long and hard, and eventually
reach the appropriate decision, given their tastes, information, and subjective
beliefs. All modes of reasoning should agree on the right answer, and if they
don￿ t, the individual should know which mode of reasoning is the correct one,
and use it alone.
Contrary to this view, we maintain that economics in general, and the
study of housing markets in particular, cannot a⁄ord to ignore cognitive
processes. There are three main reasons that support this claim. First,
the highly rational image of economic agents has come under considerable
attack by the celebrated project of Kahneman and Tversky (see, for exam-
ple, Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, 1984, and Tversky and Kahneman, 1974,
1981). While their work has been largely restricted to laboratory experi-
ments, recent developments in behavioral economics extend this line of work
to weighty economic decisions. ￿Irrational" behavior such as dynamic incon-
sistency and procrastination are analyzed in the context of serious economic
problems including consumption vs. savings decisions (see Laibson, 2001,
Laibson and Harris, 2001, Rabin, 1998, Rabin and O￿ Donoghue, 1999a,b).
By analogy, trading in real estate is probably also not immune to various
mistakes and biases. Indeed, Case and Shiller (1988, 1989, 1990) provide
evidence for both inertia and ￿irrational exuberance" in real estate prices.
It follows that studying the way people think about the real estate market
issue (see the discussion in Section 4). However, in this paper we use two very simple
models, one of which quite clearly formulates succinct general rules, whereas the other
captures case-based reasoning, involving potentially large databases.
2
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Second, many of the problems that economic agents face in reality are very
complex. In fact, some of these problems are ￿NP-Complete" in the computer
science terminology. NP-Complete problems would be too hard to solve even
if one were allowed to employ the best algorithms hitherto developed and the
fastest computers available (or that are likely to be available in the future).
In a recent paper, Aragones, Gilboa, Postlewaite, and Schmeidler (2005)
show that ￿nding the ￿best" regression model for a given data set is an NP-
Complete problem. For this reason, economic agents may not be able to
￿nd simple regularities that hold true in the database available to them. In
particular, ￿nding a good regression model to explain housing prices might
be a non-trivial computational task. Indeed, the very fact that many trained
economists cope with this problem suggests that it might not be optimally
solved by most agents in the market. These agents are therefore likely to
satisfy themselves with sub-optimal solutions. Which sub-optimal solutions
will they ￿nd? Understanding reasoning processes promises to shed light on
this issue.
Finally, many important markets, including the housing market, involve
a signi￿cant speculative component. In these markets, the price of an asset
is what most agents believe the price of the asset should be. It is therefore
important to analyze how agents reason, in order to predict the beliefs they
would maintain. More generally, whenever one encounters an equilibrium se-
lection problem, one is led to ask how agents would think about this problem,
and which equilibrium would they expect to result. When di⁄erent modes of
reasoning are available, one may conceptualize the problem as an equilibrium
in the choice of a reasoning mode: if most agents reason in a certain way,
2Observe that inertia introduces history-dependence that cannot be captured by a
functional relationship between an asset characteristics and its price. In this paper, we
consider modes of reasoning that are more ￿rational". By focusing on an apartment￿ s
characteristics and ignoring its history, our agents will ignore sunk cost, whether they use
rule-based or case-based reasoning.
3
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rational for agents to follow this reasoning process. As in any coordination
game, if there is a certain a-priori reason to prefer a certain strategy (mode
of reasoning), it is likely to become a focal point (Schelling, 1960) and to
be reinforced by equilibrium dynamics. In this context, our question can be
restated as asking, which mode of reasoning is likely to be a focal point in
the housing market?
To conclude, understanding how economic agents reason may help up
predict how they will behave. This is true for agents who are blatantly
￿irrational", for those who are boundedly rational, capable of all but the
most complex computations, and for agents who are fully rational, but who
operate in a speculative market and attempt to guess which equilibrium is
going to be played.
1.3 Hypothesis
We hypothesized that, due to the speculative nature of the real-estate mar-
ket, it will give rise to rule-based reasoning more than would other, less
speculative markets. As a reference for comparison we take the market for
rental apartments. This appears to be a similar market, where the specu-
lative component is practically nonexistent. Indeed, a rental apartment is
almost a pure consumption good. Apartments do sometimes get sublet, but
subletting is not always possible, and is rarely planned a-priori. It seems safe
to assume that a person who rents an apartment does not focus on how much
it could be sublet for as much as a person who buys an apartment focuses
on how much it could be sold for.
An apartment for sale is partly a consumption good, and partly an invest-
ment. Its value, should one wish to re-sell it, is determined by the market.
It follows that a person who considers buying an apartment needs to worry
not only about how much the apartment is worth to her, but also how much
it is worth to others. The purchase of apartment becomes a coordination
4
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it is worth, namely, whatever price the market coordinates on. It is this
coordination aspects that is missing from the problem of assessing the rent
of an apartment.3
When we compare the two modes of reasoning, we are led to ask, which
is a more reasonable equilibrium in the context of a coordination game? If
the market has to coordinate on one mode of reasoning, is it more likely to
coordinate on case-based or on rule-based reasoning? We suggest that the
answer is the latter, namely, that rule-based reasoning is easier to coordinate
on. The reason is that rules are simple to state and to transmit, whereas
cases are numerous and di¢ cult to convey. To illustrate this point, imagine
that an experienced real-estate agent wishes to transfer her knowledge to a
young colleague. If this knowledge takes the form of a rule, it will generally
be succinct and easily stated. If, however, the expert￿ s knowledge is case-
based, it is necessary to convey the expert￿ s similarity judgments, but also the
entire database of cases that she uses for generating assessments. It follows
that rules, which are by nature succinct and easy to describe, are easier
to coordinate on than are cases. We therefore hypothesize that case-based
reasoning will be relatively more prevalent in the rental market, whereas
rule-based reasoning will have a relative advantage in the sales market.
1.4 Methodology
How could we ￿nd which mode of reasoning people use? More generally, how
can we tell how people think? The most direct evidence seems to come from
neuroscience. Measuring brain activity appears to be the closest one can
get to actual thinking processes. Unfortunately, neuroeconomics does not
3It was pointed out to us that another aspect of coordination, which might be present
in both markets, is the coordination among sellers/owners regarding the price/rent they
ask. It appears, however, that both markets appear to be competitive enough to rule out
coordination among sellers. In any event, our hypothesis relies only on the argument that
the sales market has a stronger coordination component than the rental market.
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reasoning.
An alternative approach would be to use behavior data as indirect evi-
dence for the type of thinking that must have brought them about. This can
be done experimentally or empirically, where each method has its familiar
merits and weaknesses. In this paper we adopt an empirical approach. We
analyze two databases of asking prices on apartments in the greater Tel-Aviv
area: one consists of apartments for rent, and the other ￿for sale. Each
database is analyzed using two di⁄erent statistical techniques, where each
technique is interpreted as a model of the actual reasoning processes that
agents go through in generating the asking prices in our databases. For
this purpose, we choose the simplest models of rule-based reasoning and of
case-based reasoning. We do not compare the most sophisticated statistical
techniques in an attempt to obtain accurate numerical predictions. Rather,
we compare the most intuitive models in an attempt to capture some of the
features of the reasoning of actual agents in the market.
Clearly, this empirical approach does not directly test the hypothesis
stated above. First, we use market data that can only serve as indirect
evidence regarding processes of thinking. Second, the two models we compare
are rather extreme, and we tend to believe that none of them is perfectly
realistic. Third, various assumptions will be made in the estimation process,
most notably, that di⁄erent agents share the values of various parameters.
Finally, we do not o⁄er a statistical test of our hypothesis. Rather, we
compare two non-nested models by using their out-of-sample prediction error,
their in-sample likelihood value and their Akaike and Schwartz criteria, as
measures of their relative success.4
Having said that, we suggest that the exercise conducted in this paper is
4The Akaike (AIC, Akaike, 1974) and Schwartz (SC, Schwartz, 1978) criteria are com-
mon measures for model selection, which are based on the sum of the normalized log-
likelihood and a penalty that is an increasing function of the number of parameters. The
preferred model is the one that has lower criteria values.
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to believe that rule-based reasoning will be relatively more prevalent than
case-based reasoning in the sales market as compared to the rental market.
At the end of the exercise we ￿nd evidence that supports this claim. While
short of a compelling proof, the present analysis appears to be a relevant
piece of evidence for the hypothesis in question.
1.5 Method
For a simple model of rule-based reasoning we turn to hedonic regression
(see Rosen, 1974), where the asking price is regressed linearly on certain
characteristics of the apartment such as its size, number of rooms, ￿ oor,
etc. If we denote the asking price in observation i by Yi and the vector of
characteristics ￿by Xi = (X1
i ;:::;Xm
i ), we estimate the regression
Yi = ￿0 + ￿1X
1
i + ::: + ￿mX
m
i + "i (1)
What could serve as the counterpart case-based model? We need a simple
model of case-based assessments and we need to know how to estimate it.
We begin with Gilboa, Lieberman, and Schmeidler (2004), who axiomatize
an assessment rule that is based on a similarity function s : Rm￿Rm ! R++.
Given such a function s, n observations (X1
i ;:::;Xm
i ;Yi) for i = 1;:::;n, and
a new apartment with characteristics Xn+1 = (X1
n+1;:::;Xm
n+1), they suggest









This formula should be interpreted as follows. Ms. A wants to sell her
apartment, with characteristics Xn+1 = (X1
n+1;:::;Xm
n+1). She has to deter-
mine her asking price, Yn+1. She gets to observe the asking prices on other,
5See also Billot, Gilboa, Samet, and Schmeidler (2005), who axiomatize a multi-
dimensional version of this formula.
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characteristics of her apartment, Xn+1, and the characteristics of each apart-
ment she has seen on the market, Xi. This similarity is s(Xi;Xn+1). Next,
Ms. A decides that a reasonable asking price for her apartment will be the
similarity-weighted average of the asking prices she has observed, where the
price Yi gets a weight proportional to the similarity of apartment i to apart-
ment n + 1. As usual, the error term "n+1 stands for various unobservable
variables, inherent uncertainty, and measurement errors.
Suppose that equation (2) models the way people determine asking prices.
We would now like to estimate the function s from the data, in a way that
parallels the estimation of the coe¢ cients (￿j)0￿j￿m in linear regression. To
this end, we would like to assume that an equation such as (2) governed the
process that generated (Yt)t￿n. However, the data we have are not ordered.
Therefore, in the estimation process we assume that each Yt is distributed





+ "t for every t ￿ n (3)
Observe that we assume that the function s is the same for all individuals
who generated past data (Yt)t￿n. This assumption parallels the assumption
in equation (1), that the coe¢ cients (￿j)0￿j￿m are independent of i.6
Since we use model (3) rather than (2), the statistical analysis in Gilboa,
Lieberman, and Schmeidler (2004) is no longer appropriate for our purposes.
The analysis of model (3) is presented in this paper.
Estimating the function s from a given database is consistent with a
scenario in which all sellers have access to exactly the same database, which
is also the one we analyze. This would be the case if all sellers obtained
the same database that we have, and, more importantly, had no access to
asking prices of other sellers posted in other databases. This assumption is,
6Alternatively, one may view our approach as estimating a similarity function of a
representative agent, as axiomatized in Gilboa, Lieberman, and Schmeidler (2004).
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access to the actual database that each and every seller has. Hence, we take
the single database that we have as a proxy for the databases that each seller
had. Should our database be representative of the information that sellers
actually have, we might hope that the estimation process will be unbiased.
The equations (3) do not su¢ ce to specify the values of (Yt)t￿n as a
function of ("t)t￿n. These equations can be solved to extract the di⁄erences
between any two Yt￿ s. But if (Yt)t￿n solve (3), so would (Yt +￿)t￿n for every
￿ 2 R. We therefore add a parameter ￿ to the model, which will stand for
the expected value of (Yt)t￿n. The resulting model is:
p
n
















In this paper we take a parametric approach to the estimation of the
function s in the system (4). The advantages of a parametric approach in
our case are threefold. First, a parametric approach simpli￿es the analysis.
Second, it serves as a reasonable counterpart to the parametric approach
of linear regression, and allows a comparison of two models with the same
number of unknown parameters. Finally, our parametric approach will also
allow us to test hypotheses about the signi￿cance of particular variables in
the similarity model (4), in a way that parallels the tests of signi￿cance in
the regression model (1).
Speci￿cally, we are interested in similarity functions that depend on a
weighted Euclidean distance. De￿ne, for a vector w 2 Rm
++, the w-weighted
9
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This function allows di⁄erent variables to have di⁄erent impact on the mea-
sure of ￿distance￿ . There are two reasons for which we resort to a weighted
Euclidean distance rather than, say, standard Euclidean distance. First, the
variables are on di⁄erent scales. For instance a di⁄erence of 1 in ￿number
of rooms￿is quite di⁄erent from a di⁄erence of 1 in ￿area in square feet￿ .
Second, even if the variables were normalized, a variable such as ￿number
of rooms￿would probably be more in￿ uential than a variable such as ￿the
apartment has bars on its windows￿ . The weighted Euclidean distance allows
a wide range of distance functions, weighing the relative importance of the
variables involved.
Next, we wish to translate the distance function to a similarity function.
It is natural to assume that the similarity function is decreasing in the dis-
tance, and as the distance goes up from 0 to 1, the similarity function goes






Plugging this function into the system (4) we obtain the parametric ver-
sion of our model, which we estimate. We will henceforth refer to (4) with
the additional speci￿cation s = sw.
Given estimators (^ ￿j)0￿j￿m of the parameters (￿j)0￿j￿m in equation (1),
and estimators (^ wj)1￿j￿m of the parameters (wj)1￿j￿m in equation (4), we
can ask which model ￿ts the data better, for each of the databases we analyze.
Observe that the two models have exactly the same number of parameters,
namely, m+2 (including ￿2). We wish to compare the two models in terms of
their likelihood functions, as well as in terms of the out-of-sample predictions
generated by their maximum likelihood estimators. To this end we need
10
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function will provide an estimate of the weights (wj)1￿j￿m, and will also allow
us to test them for signi￿cance, in a way that parallels signi￿cance tests for
(￿j)0￿j￿m in linear regression.
1.6 Related Literature
Hedonic regression has been a standard tool for studying real-estate pric-
ing for decades (see Rosen, 1974). Spatial methods have also been well-
established and widely used tools. (See Ord, 1975, Ripley 1981, 1988, Anselin,
1988, and Dubin, 1988.) A typical model would regress the price variable
on several hedonic variables, as well as on other price variables, in a manner
that bears mathematical resemblance to autocorrelation techniques. Specif-
ically, whereas in an autocorrelation model a variable Yt is regressed on its
past values Yt￿1;Yt￿2;:::, in spatial models real-estate properties that are ge-
ographically close are assumed to be interrelated. Recent models of this type
include Kim, Phipps, and Anselin (2003) and Brasington and Hite (2004),
who use the following model






where W is a ￿xed, known matrix.7 Thus, in this model, the price vector
￿ depends on a weighted sum of itself, W￿. In this respect, our model (4)
resembles (7). However, in (7), the matrix W is assumed ￿xed, whereas we
derive it from a similarity function and estimate this function.
The regression model we use in this paper is a classical example of the
hedonic regression family. It is much simpler than spatial regression mod-
els such as (7). By contrast, our similarity model does not seem to have a
counterpart in the literature. It di⁄ers from spatial regression models in two
7The e¢ cacy of purely hedonic and of spatial regression models has also been a topic
of study. (See Gao, Asami, and Chung, 2002.)
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trix is estimated empirically. Second, our model uses a similarity-weighted
average formula, rather than a linear formula, as the underlying data gener-
ating process.
Our goal in this paper is to compare two modes of reasoning, represented
by two statistical methodologies. To this end, we chose to use exactly the
same variables in each model.8 In doing so, we also provided each model with
equally low levels of preliminary reasoning or external information. It stands
to reason that one may combine the two models in a way that parallels the
combination of rule-based and case-based techniques in human reasoning,
and thereby to obtain a better ￿t for the data than either model can achieve
on its own.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the statistical the-
ory. It computes the likelihood function for the model (4), and develops tests
for the signi￿cance of weights (wj)1￿j￿m. Section 3 describes the data, the
analysis conducted, and the results. It also comments on some statistical
issues that arise in the interpretation of the results. Section 4 concludes with
￿nal remarks.
8The encoding of qualitative variables may introduce di⁄erences in the number of formal
variables m in the two models. The reason is that the a qualitative variable with l > 2
possible values is encoded in the similarity model by l indicator variables, and in the
regression model ￿by (l￿1). As can be seen from Tables 4a and 5, this encoding introduced
a di⁄erence only in the sales database, where the regression uses m = 19 formal variables,
and the similarity ￿m = 20.
12
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2.1 The Likelihood function
De￿ne






































where ei is the i-th unit vector, y and " are n￿1 vectors, with " ￿ N(0;￿2I).
Note that S1 =
p
ne1, where 1 is the n ￿ 1 vector whose entries are all 1.
Hence S￿1e1 = n￿1=21, so that
y = ￿1 + S
￿1":

















Clearly, for any given (wj)1￿j￿m, the pro￿le MLE of ￿ is
^ ￿ = (1
0H1)
￿1 1
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and I (￿) is the Fisher information matrix, given by








































0 ￿ Hrs(y￿￿1);r;s = 1;:::;m+1:
9The asymptotic theory of empirical similarity models under veri￿able conditions is
discussed in Lieberman (2005).
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0 _ Hr(y ￿ ￿1);r = 1;:::;m + 1:














A more explicit calculation of IA(￿) will be given in the next sub-section.
To conduct a hypothesis test of the form
H0 : ￿r = 0 vs. H1 : ￿r > 0;r = 1;:::;m + 1;







































We reject H0 when t is large (e.g., when it exceeds 1.645, if a 5% signi￿cance
level is desired).
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p




in ￿nite samples. The variance ￿2 of
p
n(^ ￿ ￿ ￿)follows fromthe (m + 2;m + 2)-
th element of the inverse of IA(￿)
￿1.
For multiple linear hypotheses of the form
H0 : R￿ = r vs. H1 : R￿ 6= r;
where R is a q￿(m+2) matrix consisting of q < (m + 2) independent linear
hypotheses, one can use the Wald test
W =
￿










R^ ￿ ￿ r
￿
;
with an asymptotic ￿2 (q) distribution under H0. We reject H0 when W is
large.
2.3 Calculation of IA(￿)
Some simpli￿cation of the calculation of IA(￿) results from the following.
_ H1 = ￿
1
￿2H
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3.1 Data
We obtained two databases of apartments, one consisting of apartments for
sale, and one ￿ for rent. Both databases are maintained by the Student
Association of Tel-Aviv University.10 Tel-Aviv University students have free
access to the databases, whereas non-students can obtain it for a fee. Any-
one may post an apartment in the appropriate database for a fee. Posting
an apartment is done by ￿lling out a questionnaire over the phone, where
certain data are mandatory, and various verbal descriptions can be added as
comments. Each posting is paid for two months, but it is updated every two
weeks at most. At the end of a two-week cycle, the owner of the apartment is
called and asked whether she wishes to keep the posting, and if so, whether
she would like to update the asking price. The database is therefore best
conceptualized as atemporal: the asking price of an early posting may be
updated in light of newer asking prices that were posted later on. This is
re￿ ected in the seemingly circular nature of the system (4).
The two databases were sampled at the same time, early August 2003.
The rental database contained about 2000 entries, whereas the sales database
￿about 300. This size di⁄erence is typical because the students, who have
free access to the databases, are more often interested in renting than in
buying apartments.
All apartments were in the greater Tel-Aviv area. In more remote (and
less expensive) suburbs there were mostly apartments for sale. To control for
a possible e⁄ect of the suburb/township, we restricted attention to three mu-
nicipalities, in all of which there were relatively large number of apartments in
both databases: Tel-Aviv, Ramat-Gan, and Givataim. These municipalities
are geographically contiguous.
Ideally, we would like to have the exact location of each apartment as
10We thank the Student Association of Tel-Aviv University for the data.
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rather than exact addresses.11 We therefore approximated the street address
by the exact location of the midpoint of the street. We excluded from the
data very long streets, for which such an approximation would not be very
informative. We ended up with n = 1240 apartments for rent, and n = 219
apartments for sale.12
The complete list of variables for each database is given in Appendix A.
3.2 Method￿ Details
Each database was split two: a sample (learning database), consisting of
75% of the observations, and a prediction (test) database, consisting of the
remaining 25%. The prediction database was selected as each fourth observa-
tion. Since the observations were ordered by the apartment size, the sample
and prediction databases were slightly more representative of the entire data-
base they were drawn from than a completely random selection would have
been. In addition, for each data set and for each method we computed the
Akaike and Schwartz criteria over the whole sample.
For the sales and the rental database we performed the following. (i)
Regressing Y on X1;:::;Xm in the sample; (ii) ￿nding the maximum likeli-
hood similarity function for the system (4) in the sample; (iii) computing the
maximum likelihood values for the two models (regression and similarity) on
the sample; (iv) generating predictions for the prediction database using the
two methods, and computing their SSPE (sum of squared prediction errors).
11This is typical of such databases. Because sellers normally do not grant real estate
agents exclusivity rights, agents do not provide the exact address until they meet the
buyer/renter and have them sign an exclusivity form. As a result, exact addresses almost
never appear in public postings.
12We thank Professor Juval Portugali of Tel-Aviv University for access to a database
that contained street lengths, as well as geographical coordinates of each street￿ s midpoint.
18
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Vol. 7 [2007], Iss. 1 (Advances), Art. 10
http://www.bepress.com/bejte/vol7/iss1/art103.3 Results
Appendix B contains the estimated values of the relevant parameters and
their standard deviations.
The main results are reported in Table 1.
Table 1: Goodness of ￿t measures for regression and similarity, for the
two databases.
Sales (n = 219) Rent (n = 1240)
Regression Similarity Regression Similarity
LIKE ￿876 ￿902 ￿5;420 ￿5;380
SSPE 146;759 185;160 2;550;834 1;985;600
AIC 10.86 11.17 11.74 11.60
SC 11.17 11.50 11.84 11.70
LIKE ￿Value of the log-likelihood function (in-sample, 75% of the data points)
SSPE ￿Sum of Squared Prediction Errors (out of sample, remaining 25% of
the data points)
AIC ￿Akaike Information Criterion (computed over the whole sample)
SC ￿Schwarz Criterion (computed over the whole sample)
Table 1 reports the value of the log-likelihood function (LIKE), the value
of the sum of squared prediction errors (SSPE) and the values of the Akaike
(AIC) and Schwartz (SC) criteria, for the two databases, for both the regres-
sion and the similarity models.
Table 1 shows that on the database of apartments for sale, the regression
model performs better than does the similarity model: the likelihood function
in the sample is higher for the regression, and the SSPE out-of-sample is
lower. This pattern is reversed in the database of apartments for rent: in
this database, the similarity model achieves a higher value of the likelihood
function, as well as lower value of the SSPE. The AIC and SC values are
consistent with this pattern.
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for sale, the rule-based (regression) model performs better than does the case-
based (similarity) model, whether it is in terms of maximizing the likelihood
function in the sample, minimizing the sum of squared errors out-of-sample,
or minimizing the AIC or SC criteria. This pattern is reversed in databases
of apartments for rent.
3.4 Statistical Issues
Perusing Tables 1 and 2, one notices the di⁄erence in the sample size between
the two databases considered. The number of apartments for sale, n = 219, is
lower than the number of the apartments for rent, n = 1240, by a factor of 6
almost. This discrepancy raises the question, can the di⁄erence between the
performance of the regression and the similarity models in the two database
be simply due to the sizes? That is, is it possible that the e⁄ect we have
found is solely a statistical artifact, and has nothing to do with the economic
reasoning behind purchase and rental decisions?
This possibility might appear quite plausible. The regression model uses
the data only for the estimation of the regression equation. If the data gener-
ating process (DGP) were indeed (1), and if we were to miraculously discover
the actual parameters ￿0;￿1;:::;￿m;￿2, then we would need no further data
in order to make the best predictions possible. By contrast, the similarity
model (3) is inherently data-dependent. Datapoints are not only used to
estimate the parameters ￿;w1;:::;wm;￿2: datapoints also enter the DGP of
(4) itself. Hence, having a larger database will improve the predictions gen-
erated by the similarity model even if the true parameters were known to us.
Conversely, more datapoints may improve the predictions of the similarity
model even if the estimates of the parameters w1;:::;wm are not accurate.
To see this point more clearly, assume that the actual DGP involves a
non-linear relationship between Y and X1;:::;Xm. The regression model is
restricted to linear relationships. By contrast, the similarity model generates
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i￿n ^ s(Xi;Xn+1)Yi P
i￿n ^ s(Xi;Xn+1)
(9)
where ^ s is the estimated similarity function. Thus, for every prediction ^ Yn+1,
the similarity model uses all datapoints, in a formula that may be viewed as
local interpolation. This prediction is akin to the Nadaraya-Watson estimator
for non-parametric regression, where the estimated ^ s=
P
i￿n ^ s(Xi;Xn+1) plays
the role of the kernel function. Finding the appropriate kernel function is
typically considered a theoretical problem. In our model, we turn it into an
empirical problem.13 But even a similarity function ^ s that does not have
the optimal weights w1;:::;wm could serve as a kernel function, and may be
expected to generate better predictions for Y than would linear regression,
provided that n is large and that the similarity function is not too ￿￿ at￿ .
To test the possibility that our results are solely an artifact of the sample
size, we ran the two models on sub-samples of the rental database. The
number of datapoints in the sample of the sales database was 164 (roughly
75% of n = 219). Hence we wished to test the models on a sub-sample of
nk = 164 datapoints from the rental database. Recall that the corresponding
number in the entire rental database was 930 (75% of 1240). We also took
a sample for an intermediate value of 620 (a half of 1240). For each sample
size, nk = 164, 620, and 930, we selected a sample of the apartments for rent,
ran the two models, and compared them in terms of LIKE and SSPE. The
SSPE was computed over the remaining database. Thus, for a sample of nk
datapoints we had a prediction database containing (1240￿nk) observations.
The results are reported in Table 2.
13Finding an optimal bandwidth for the kernel function is often done empirically. In
our model, all m parameters of the kernel functions are estimated from the data, allowing
us to empirically determine their relative importance.
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rental database.
k Regression Similarity SSE ratio
164 MLE -951 -974
SSE 8,690,667 7,853,000 1.11
620 MLE -3630 -3,605
SSE 4,543,413 3,783,500 1.20
930 MLE -5,420 -5,380
SSE 2,550,834 1,985,600 1.28
LIKE ￿Value of the log-likelihood function (in-sample, 75% of the data points)
SSPE ￿Sum of Squared Prediction Errors (out of sample, remaining 25% of
the data points)
Table 2 indicates that the sample size does indeed have an e⁄ect on the
relative performance of the two methods. Considering the LIKE criterion
￿rst, the similarity model does not perform as well as the regression model
for a small sample (nk = 164). The two models have very similar likelihood
values for a mid-size sample (nk = 620), and it is only for a large sample
(nk = 930) that the similarity model performs better than does the regression
model.
Turning to the SSPE criterion, it turns out that the similarity model
performs better than does the regression model on all three databases. Yet,
when we compare the SSPE￿ s generated by the two models, we ￿nd that for
a larger sample the advantage of the similarity model increases. To see this,
we computed the ratio of the SSPE of the regression to the SSPE of the
similarity model (in the last column of the table). As can be seen, this ratio
grows with nk: whereas the regression model￿ s prediction is worse than that
of the similarity model only by 11% for a small sample, this factor grows to
28% for a large database.
Thus, our data indicate that the statistical e⁄ect we suspected does indeed
exist. Yet, it is important to note that this statistical e⁄ect does not explain
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of the similarity model was lower than that of the regression model, while
this pattern was reversed on an equally-sized database of apartments for
sale. Hence, the statistical e⁄ect cannot be solely responsible for the results
reported in Tables 1 and 2, and the economic e⁄ect we hypothesized probably
plays a role as well.
Table 2 also suggests that if we had a larger database of apartments
for sale, it is quite possible that the similarity model would have obtained
better results than would the regression model. Generally speaking, one
should expect the similarity model to perform better for larger databases.
We conjecture that this statistical e⁄ect would be independent of the type
of the data analyzed. The economic e⁄ect, however, implies that for rental
data the similarity model would be better than the regression model already
for smaller databases than for sales data.
The statistical e⁄ect we conjecture might also be re￿ ected in human rea-
soning. Speci￿cally, it is possible that people use rule-based reasoning when
they have a database that is not too large, but that they switch to case-based
reasoning when the database is very large. This might be optimal because,
when the database is large enough, there is no need to develop theories (or
rules): every possible instance, that is, every relevant combination of values
of X1;:::;Xm, has enough cases in memory that are similar to it, for the
person to be able to come up with a good assessment of the value of Y based
on these similar cases.14
Observe that the similarity model performs better than the regression
model in terms of a low SSPE already for small sample sizes (low values of nk
above), whereas a better performance in terms of a higher LIKE is obtained
14When the database is very small, it may not contain enough datapoints to support
any theory. Thus, case-based reasoning may be more prevalent than rule-based reasoning
for small and for large databases, whereas rule-based reasoning may be more prevalent for
medium-sized databases, that contain enough observations to generate theories, but not
enough observations to do without theories.
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The reason might be the following. The LIKE criterion is the criterion by
which we choose the parameters of both models. It should therefore be
expected that the parameters chosen for a particular sample will not perform
as well on the prediction database (out-of-sample).15 This bias exists to
the same degree for the regression and for the similarity model. However,
the similarity model has a self-correction mechanism: because it uses the
entire database for each prediction it generates, it may perform well out-of-
sample even if the similarity function, which was chosen based on in-sample
performance, is not necessarily the best one. By contrast, the regression
model does not have any similar self-correction mechanism: the regression
coe¢ cients that were chosen based on their in-sample performance are used
for out-of-sample prediction with no further aid from the data.
4 Concluding Remarks
It stands to reason that certain combinations of the regression and the simi-
larity models may perform better than both in terms of providing the best ￿t.
For instance, one may use our similarity-weighted average and plug it into
the regression model as another explanatory variable. This would resemble
a hedonic spatial regression, in which one attempts to estimate the weight
matrix (along the lines suggested in this paper). However, such a hybrid
model will not be able to compare the two modes of reasoning in their pure
form.
An interesting theoretical question is the precise de￿nition of rule-based
vs. case-based reasoning. For instance, if one chooses ￿ve cases for generating
15This might be viewed as a type of ￿regression to the mean￿phenomenon: the particular
values of the parameters that we choose are those that happen to perform well in the
sample. Part of the success of these parameters might be due to random factors, and
these need not be equally auspicious outside the sample. It follows that one should not
expect the chosen parameters to perform on a new database as well as they did on the
sample.
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the method be called if there is a ￿xed rule for choosing these ￿ve cases?
Or, to consider an extreme example from a di⁄erent context, suppose that a
voter in a presidential election votes for the candidate who is most similar to
JFK. Is this a case-based method, because JFK was a particular case? Or is
it a rule-based method, because it can be described as a simple rule?
In general, we propose to refer to a method as ￿rule-based" if it depends
continuously on a bounded number of parameters, and as ￿case-based" if
the number of parameters needed to describe it increases to in￿nity with the
size of the database. However, given our simplistic modeling, the distinction
between rule-based and case-based reasoning is quite clear: the former is
modeled by linear regression, which is a general rule, making no reference
to particular cases, whereas the latter is modeled by a similarity-weighted
average that makes use of all the available data points. Thus, both models
avoid the tricky examples, such as the voting example above, and it seems safe
to suggest that the regression model is ￿more rule-based than case-based" as
compared to the similarity-weighted average model.
We do not expect to obtain a qualitatively clear result, saying that people
think in terms of cases or in terms of rules. We believe that both modes are
involved in almost any reasoning, and that a variety of factors may a⁄ect
their relative importance. Our focus in this paper is on a particular economic
factor, namely, the nature of the market under discussion. We conjecture that
in general, in comparison to rule-based reasoning, case-based reasoning will
be more prevalent in non-speculative markets than in speculative ones.
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No sections in the street indicates length of street
View verbal
Roof verbal





Comments (for Tables 3a and 3b): ￿Indicator￿variables are mandatory.
￿Verbal￿ variables are also indicator variables that were picked from the
verbal description. The variables ￿x coordinate￿ , ￿y coordinate￿ , and ￿No of
sections in the street￿were obtained from the geographical database using
the street name. The rest of the variables originate from the posting.
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Bars indicates if windows have bars
(See Comments following Table 3a.)
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Table 4a: Variables and estimated coe¢ cients (and standard deviations) for
Regression and Similarity ￿Sales database
Regression Similarity
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Variable ^ ￿j ^ wj











































￿ ￿Signi￿cant at the 5% level.
Standard deviation of 0:000 indicates a positive number smaller than
0:0005.
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Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007Table 4b: Variables and estimated coe¢ cients (and standard deviations)
for Regression and Similarity ￿Rentals database
Regression Similarity
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￿ ￿Signi￿cant at the 5% level.
Standard deviation of 0:000 indicates a positive number smaller than
0:0005.
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for the sales database and various sample sizes of the rental database
k Regression Similarity
Sales 164 4 7
No. of Coe⁄cients-Sales 19 20
Rent 164 5 10
Rent 620 9 15
Rent 930 13 13
No. of Coe⁄cients-Rent 23 23
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